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Abstract—We present the first smart phone tool that is ca-
pable of self-compilation, mutation and viral spreading. Our
autonomous app does not require a host computer to alter
its functionality, change its appearance and lacks the normal
necessity of a central app store to spread among hosts. We
pioneered survival skills for mobile software in order to
overcome disrupted Internet access due to natural disasters
and human made interference, like Internet kill switches or
censored networks. Internet kill switches have proven to be an
effective tool to eradicate open Internet access and all forms
of digital communication within an hour on a country-wide
basis. We present the first operational tool that is capable of
surviving such digital eradication.
Index Terms—self-compilation, mutation and viral spreading.
1. Introduction
Natural disasters and human made disruptions can both
be the cause of communication systems failure. Whenever
a natural disaster occurs communication infrastructure is
often completely destroyed or affected in such a way that it
becomes unusable for longer periods of time. Terrible loss of
life has been blamed directly on the breakdown of cell phone
service in the stricken area after the earthquake in Haiti in
2011 [1]. The infrastructure in the capital had collapsed with
the buildings and remaining networks were out of range
and quickly overloaded. The landfall of hurricane Katrina
in 2005 caused a communication blackout and large scale
network outages lasting for multiple weeks [2]. Besides the
flooding, the continuing power outages disrupted Internet
access for months. An unstable electrical grid has caused
multiple large scale blackouts in the United States in recent
history [3]. Without a stable electricity supply many forms
of modern communication are useless, because they depend
on infrastructure that has to be powered continuously to
function without sufficient backup power. Not just highly
developed countries have to deal with a troubled energy
supply. Especially the weak grid in Africa hurts the economy
of countries like Ghana, Malawi and Tanzania [4].
Besides the natural causes and indirect human causes
just mentioned, there are also multiple known cases of
various intentional communication blackouts orchestrated
on a state level. For instance Cuba is barely connected to
the Internet all, prompting its citizens to come up with
offline Internet [5]. The Great Firewall of China is the
well known name of all the layers of censorship that the
Chinese government enforces in all their territories [6]. This
effectively causes a communication blackout that affects all
outbound connections from within the borders of China. The
government of Iran blocks almost 50% of the worlds top
500 most visited websites [7]. In Turkey social media were
completely blocked for almost a day due to a temporary
broadcast ban following a deadly attack in the capital [8].
These are just a few examples of how a single actor can
cause communication systems to fail to function.
Problem Description
We aim to address the problem of robust and resilient
mobile systems, specifically usable without exiting infras-
tructure and consisting of innocuous hardware & software;
moving toward a censorship-free Internet: [9]
• The adversary can observe, block, delay, replay, and
modify traffic on all underlying transport. Thus, the
physical layer is insecure.
• The adversary has a limited ability to compromise
smart phones or other participating devices. If a
device is compromised, the adversary can access any
information held in the devices´ volatile memory or
persistent storage.
• The adversary cannot break standard cryptographic
primitives, such as block ciphers and message-
authentication codes.
2. Related work
Various projects attempted to provide at least a partial
solution to the problem just described. Beginning with the
fact that any network which has a single point of failure is
vulnerable. For example a mobile network that covers an
area with a single cell tower, or wherever in dense cities
there are tall buildings blocking the signals of all but one
tower. Even redundant infrastructure becomes useless when
the switch point is wiped out or otherwise disabled. That
is one of the reasons why Internet switches are critical
points for wide spread outages. Additionally such central
ar
X
iv
:1
51
1.
00
44
4v
2 
 [c
s.C
Y]
  4
 N
ov
 20
15
points also have been used in Egypt in 2011 [10] and Syria
in 2012 [11] to quickly terminate all Internet access in a
country intentionally. Encrypted tunneling and anonymous
proxy technology is available [12] to circumvent some forms
of blockades but uses existing infrastructure, thus does not
solve the problems just mentioned. The challenge is now
to use the pervasive smart phone phenomenon to create a
resilient alternative Internet infrastructure.
Mesh networks are a solution to this problem because
every wireless device effectively becomes a cell tower and
switch itself, thus providing connectivity service wherever
it goes, as long as it stays within reach of any other mobile
device connected to the mesh network; otherwise it will be
fairly limited connectivity. Now there is no single point of
failure anymore as all devices have this cell tower capability
and could therefore take over for each other. This way
the network is protected against damage to infrastructure,
because that is not required anymore, as well as power
outages or an unstable electricity supply, because wireless
devices typically carry batteries themselves. For example the
power bank phone carrying a 10000mAh battery capable
of charging other devices as well via USB [13] is still
small enough to be carried on person, so it will survive
a natural disaster together with its user. Compare this to
a current smart phone having a capacity of less than a
third than that, around 3000mAh. The phone is popular in
Ghana, which is not surprising since the capital regularly
suffers from blackouts lasting more than 36 hours. Mesh
networks can differ significantly in the way they are set up.
For instance they may grow organically without oversight
or they may be deployed and extended in an organized
manner by a central authority. Meraki is an example of the
latter kind [14]. Having a central authority re-introduces
the problem of human made failure of the network. To
overcome this problem various communities have formed
around projects that are deploying DIY-mesh-networks in
multiple cities around the world. For example Guifi.net in
Spain [15], the Free Network Foundation [16] and Commo-
tion [17] in America, FreiFunk [18] in Germany and the
Serval project [19] in New Zealand. All of these projects
offer software to run on ones´ own router or smart phone
to join the mesh network, subsequently providing other
wireless devices access via said router or phone, effectively
extending the mesh network. In addition to that the Freedom
Network Foundation also offers a hardware design for the
FreedomTower to improve performance of the network in
the entire neighborhood, and even a lab in two separate
data centers open for anyone to find out and evaluate the
best configuration of hardware and software for connectivity
on a larger scale. The general aim of these projects is to
provide a robust and resilient censorship free communication
network anywhere the users are, unaffected by the lack of
communication infrastructure.
Having the same general aim here are a few specific
applications for smart phones using Bluetooth and WiFi to
implement the mesh network:
• Open Garden: Internet Sharing [20].
• FireChat [21] also from Open Garden; chat only.
• Bleep [22] from BitTorrent; supports chat and voice-
calls.
• ShadowTalk [23] from PeerSafe; supports chat and
voice-chat with time-lock.
• Serval Mesh [19] from the Serval Project; supports
file transfers in addition to chat and voice-calls.
• Tuse [24] from Tuse; supports sharing the app p2p
in addition to file transfers, chat and voice-calls.
• Twimight [25] for using Twitter offline until it finds
an uplink to Internet.
All but the last two of these apps support public messaging
and private messaging with end to end encryption. All of
them are free to use and available on the Google app
store. However that central app store is, by definition of it
being central, vulnerable to the same problems as mentioned
before. Either a decentralized app store is required, like
tsukiji [26], or the possibility of downloading and installing
the app without the use of an app store all together. This
process is called side loading and is possible on the Android
platform. However few apps are capable of virally spreading.
Apps that could benefit greatly from using such technology
are the eyeWitness app [27], from the Eye Witness project,
because a tactic to safeguard a user from an oppressive
entity would be to make sure multiple copies of eyewitness
evidence are virally spread as fast and easy as possible.
Although multiple IDE apps are available for Android
[28], none of them can replicate themselves like a Quine
and neither are they capable of autonomously mutating their
source. An earlier app from Delft University of Technology
called DroidStealth [29] has very limited mutation capabil-
ity, only the binary form and not the source code can be
mutated, meaning that the functionality cannot be changed,
only the app name and icon, however it can virally spread
via Android Beam.
A polymorphic computer virus avoids detection by mu-
tating itself [30]. Each time a new host is infected the
binary software is altered to look completely different, yet
remains unchanged in functionality. Polymorphic viruses are
an established technique, dating back before 1997. These
mutating viruses do not have access to their own source code
and lack an embedded compiler, making self-compilation
more generic and likely extra powerful.
3. Autonomous App Design
The following design aspects are aimed to accomplish
the criteria set out in the problem description: a robust
and resilient mobile system. Smart phones have multiple
wireless technologies on board, like Bluetooth and WiFi,
carry a battery and are very widespread all around the world,
making it the perfect platform to use for a mesh network.
Therefore to be most accessible the software will need to
run on the open source platform with the largest install base:
Android.
Mobile service providers often modify the operating
system and do not grant users administrative privileges on
their own device for whatever reason. Gaining root access
to take these administrative privileges by force is possible,
but not without the help of a development computer. This
means that the app must not require root access to the phone
in order to be autonomous.
3.1. Viral Spreading
Making the app capable of outputting itself and sending
it to another device eliminates the normal necessity of a
central app store and makes it capable of spreading like
a virus. This bio-inspired mutation and spreading requires
modifying the source code and the capability of running on
a variety of host hardware, as described in the next subsec-
tion. Figure 1 shows viral spreading from within an offline
region until it reaches an area with unrestricted Internet
access. Building upon existing trust networks, like family or
business partners, it becomes evident that interconnection of
local clusters is key.
Figure 1. 1) P2P wireless transfer via NFC and Bluetooth to any number of
devices. 2) Any device can mutate the app and distribute without limitation.
3) One strain of the app travels out of the offline region. 4) The surviving
strain is connected to the rest of the world.
3.2. Self-compile
While virally spreading the app may encounter different
platforms, like a new Android version or hardware architec-
ture, so the app needs to be able to re-compile for such
a new environment. In addition the app needs to solve
dependencies for new environments that may be unavailable
at the time the app needs to re-compile so it should contain
all build tools and libraries that may be required during the
entire Android build process.
Usually Android apps are developed on a computer with
a software development kit (SDK) and integrated develop-
ment environment (IDE). To make the app fully function
without the need for such a system requires integrating
the SDK and entire build chain into the app. Effectively
it requires an embedded app factory consisting of all the
required build tools, chained together. Various levels of self-
compilation can be discerned: 1. the source code 2. the
3rd party libraries 3. the build tools. Compiling the non-
Java tools and C/C++ libraries would require the native
development kit (NDK) in addition to the SDK.
Because it is possible for the user to user to add and
remove any content in the installation package the app is
capable of serving as an alternative communication network.
3.3. Mutate
To increase the survival skills of the app in adverse
conditions it must be able to be modified immediately when
needed on the device itself. Crowdsourcing would be a
transparent and decentralized way of improving the survival
skills of the app. Being able to integrate other pieces of
code, resources and new or modified libraries into the app
makes it incredible versatile and adjustable to any situation.
Periodic mutation would prevent a single signature of the
app to be made in order to block it.
Figure 2. User interface for mutation.
The user has full access to and control over the source
code, but needs to be aware of possible compiler injection
by the running instance of the code, especially in case the
app was received from an untrusted source.
Leveraging the power of reflection in code the app could
indicate and perhaps look for new components itself that
are available in the mesh network and become even more
resilient through continuous self-modeling. The mutation is
aimed at creating generations of the app with increased
fitness.
3.4. Innocuous Components
Using innocuous hardware and software is especially
important in case of a dissent network [31]. A casual search
or monitoring may not pick up on an app that looks like
a calculator or is generally inconspicuous. Also separate
pieces of code may be innocuous on their own, so it is
only a matter of putting these together. A game could for
example be embedded with a special launch pattern to open
the encrypted content within.
Anonymity vs. Trust. Removing usage tracks and signing
the application with the default debug key makes it hard to
trace back to an individual user. In case of illegal embed-
ded content this could provide author, publisher and reader
anonymity, but not server, document and query anonymity
[32]. The trustworthiness however of any true anonymous
source is unverifiable, so transitive trust is desirable.
Plausible Innocence. To be able to use IDE features if the
user is not a software developer may be tricky. However
this depends on the many different use cases for non-dissent
purposes of the app, so the usage is not incriminating in and
of itself. As technology only amplifies human intent [31]
having IDE features on your phone does not create political
movement. Like a hammer it can be used for good or evil
and will find its role in the social network of people that
is already established. To minimize use for harm various
attack vectors, like staining, need to be considered.
4. Implementation
We fully implemented our autonomous app design. The
source code of the SelfCompileApp is available on GitHub
[33].
As described in the previous chapter the Android SDK
and platform library are required for building an installable
app package (.apk). Figure 3 shows the implemented tool
chain that is required to let the app self-compile on the
device. The Android Open Source Project (AOSP) made
most of the build tools source code available online [34].
All tools except the Android Asset Packaging Tool (aapt)
are implemented in Java, which is convenient since Android
apps can be written in Java as well.
4.1. Android Asset Packaging Tool
The Android Asset Packaging Tool compiles the app
manifest and resources like images, layout and language
Figure 3. Implemented build chain.
.xml files into one binary file and generates R.java. This
file contains all the IDs of the compiled resources that can
be referenced from the app source code. Aapt then packages
the binary resources and all files in the assets folder into a
preliminary .apk file.
Since aapt is not implemented in Java it requires the
NDK to build it for any CPU instruction set(s) you want to
support, which is part of the extended Android build process
[35]. The app JavaIDEdroid showed this works for Android
4.4 and older [36] and proved to be compatible with Android
5.0 by dropping the resources for ultra high density screens
because of the used older version of aapt. All required native
shared libraries are bundled into one native shared library
file (.so) and included in the app installer package. Because
of a missing dependency CynogenMod was used for all
tested devices running an Android API level higher than
18.
To remove the NDK dependency completely only aapt
would need to be implemented in Java. This allows for easy
viral spreading to new hardware platforms and make the app
fully capable of mutating all the dependencies and build
tools, without the need for the GNU Compiler Collection
(GCC) which TerminalIDE uses [37].
4.2. Java Compiler
The Eclipse Compiler for Java (ECJ) is chosen because
it is implemented in Java, so it can be easily included as a
library in the app but also makes the compiler capable of
compiling itself. Currently all build tools are just included
in the app as a library, but could be build from source just
like the app source code.
4.3. Dalvik Executable
After compiling the source to Java bytecode it needs to
be converted into Dalvik bytecode because Android used to
run Java in a process virtual machine (VM) called Dalvik.
In Android 5.0 this VM was replaced by an application
runtime environment called Android Runtime (ART) which
is backwards compatible and still uses the exact same Dalvik
executable files (.dex). This conversion process with the dx
tool proved to require a huge amount of RAM, or the tool
contains a serious memory leak. Fortunately it is possible
to convert the libraries separately so they are cached and
only converted again if the hash of the .jar file has changed.
The source code is converted into one .dex file as well and
subsequently merged with with the converted libraries. Both
the dx tool and DexMerger tool are implemented in Java and
available from AOSP [34].
4.4. Android App Package Builder
All compiled resources, native libraries, compiled files
and asset files are combined by the ApkBuilder tool that
also implemented in Java and available from AOSP [34].
This includes the Android.jar platform library, required for
compiling the Java source code, and the Java KeyStore,
required for the last link of the build chain. The ApkBuilder
has the capability of signing the .apk itself, but does not
support Java KeyStore, so a user would not be able to use
Figure 4. Build in progress.
or create a private key store without additional tools. The
uncompiled resources, manifest, source code, libraries and
pre-dexed libraries are zipped and also added to the .apk.
4.5. Package Signer
As long as the same package name is used and the .apk is
signed with the same certificate as a previous installation of
the app it can be seamlessly updated. Otherwise the mutated
app will be installed alongside the other version, or fail to
install if the package name is the same but the certificates do
not match. The tool ZipSigner [38] is used to sign the .apk
file that can use any Java KeyStore, one of which containing
the default Android debug key is included in the app. As
long as side loading is enabled on the Android device, which
is necessary to be able to install the .apk file at all, the use
of a debug key does not pose any problems.
4.6. Wireless Transfer
To spread the app trough the air the wireless technology
of Android Beam is used that leverages the ease of use of
near field communication (NFC) for easy connection set up
of a Bluetooth large file transfer. The user only needs to hold
the backs of two devices together and tap the screen while
the app is running to transfer it. Bluetooth is then enabled
on both devices, the devices are paired and Bluetooth gets
disabled again after the transfer is complete, all completely
automatic.
5. Performance Analysis
We measured both the time to self-compile the app into
an installable package (.apk) and also measured the time
to wireless transfer the .apk to different devices like in a
typical viral spreading scenario. Figure 5 shows the build
time for 10 consecutive runs on four different devices.
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Figure 5. Time to self-compile the app into an installable package.
Very notable is the significant difference in speed be-
tween the Galaxy Nexus and the other devices. Besides
the different hardware capabilities, this can be partially
explained by the difference in how the Dalvik bytecode
is executed. As described in the previous section, Android
used to run Java in a process virtual machine (VM) called
Dalvik that performed just-in-time (JIT) compilation. In
Android 5.0 this VM was replaced by an application runtime
environment called Android Runtime (ART) that performs
ahead-of-time (AOT) compilation.
Also very notable was the apparent thermal throttling of
the Nexus 5 device. After a period of letting it cool down the
results returned to the level of the first couple measurements.
The wireless transfer speed of four different Android
Beam and Bluetooth large file transfer enabled devices was
tested by sending over the .apk of 30.1MB. For each pair
of the four devices the averages of 3 consecutive transfers
are shown in table 1. Two cells are left blank because only
one Nexus 5 and one Nexus 10 device were at our disposal.
Notable is the slow transfer speed of only the Nexus 10.
PPPPPPFrom:
To: Galaxy Nexus Nexus 5 Nexus 6 Nexus 10
Galaxy Nexus 227 221 209 419
Nexus 5 211 149 360
Nexus 6 198 147 139 357
Nexus 10 409 400 359
TABLE 1. AVERAGE TRANSFER TIME IN SECONDS OF 3 CONSECUTIVE
TRANSFERS PER DEVICE PAIR.
6. Conclusion & Future Work
Our work shows that it is possible for an Android
app to be autonomous in recompiling, mutating and virally
spreading over multiple hosts all without the need for a host
computer, root permissions and an app store. Therefore our
work provides a robust and resilient network and platform
to overcome disruptions due to natural disasters or made
made interference. Since the user can add and remove any
content in the app a social media experience does no longer
have to be hampered by Internet kill switches as it is now.
The app currently can spread among Android devices
and as a next step could be considered cross-compiling for
the Android, iOS and Windows Phone platforms. Continu-
ous self-modeling through code reflection and higher levels
of self-compilation, by recompiling the 3rd party libraries
and build tools themselves, are left for future work.
A point for consideration is the minimization of the use
for harm of the app, and the risk for harm by use of the app.
Various attack vectors could be considered to improve the
fitness of the app and lower the risk of usage in a dissent
network use case.
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